Galia Golan: An Academic Pioneer on the Soviet Union, Peace and Conflict Studies, and a Peace and Feminist Activist by Galia Golan

Author:Galia Golan
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783319952130
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

6.4 Conclusion

Other factors may contribute to Soviet decision-making about the nature of support to be rendered to a movement. The chances for success, the degree of risk that involvement would bring, and the importance of the area from Moscow’s point of view may all play a role. The time factor, such as different behavior corresponding to different periods, possibly in connection with the Soviet succession issue, cannot be ruled out. The evidence of these factors, however, is extremely contradictory. One might argue, for example, that the movements operating on or near Soviet borders (Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan) are of much greater importance to Moscow than those farther away, such as the Palestinians or the Africans. Yet the volatility of an area and the potential risk for the Soviets does not necessarily limit Soviet involvement or determine its positions. In fact, in some cases, such as the MPLA, the PLO and the NLF, or the Bengalis, the global and regional elements, despite their higher risk potential, may actually have contributed to greater Soviet involvement. Conversely, the lower risk conflicts, generally the secessionist ones, in which local factors are central, have not seen greater risk-taking behavior on the part of the Soviets. Even willingness to support armed struggle, possibly only on a limited basis, is often more apparent in higher-risk situations related to anticolonialism than many lower- risk situations involving secessionists. This is not to say that the risk involved does not enter into Soviet calculations. It would not make sense for Moscow to ignore the risk factor. But risk does not appear to demonstrate a clear pattern with regard to national liberation movements, short of the fact that the Soviets are not willing to intervene militarily on behalf of any movement, or send on-the-spot advisors prior to independence.

No greater consistency can be found with regard to chances for success. One might argue that the Soviets are more consistent in their support for the anticolonials because of the belief in the inevitability of their victory. This may well explain the clear difference between Soviet behavior towards anticolonials, on one hand, and the lack of consistency towards the secessionists, on the other. The Soviets’ somewhat greater willingness to support armed struggle for the anticolonials and the ANC than for the secessionists and the PLO may be connected with this factor inasmuch as compromise, specifically a limitation of objectives, is more possible with the secessionists than in the all-or-nothing situation of the anticolonials. Whether the chance of success is a criterion within the secessionist or internal categories is unclear.

The timing of Soviet involvement may be relevant. The early 1970s was largely a period of restraint, while the mid-to-late 1970s saw a period of greater involvement, and the 1980s a return to restraint. In Africa, there would appear to be some logic to this, with 1975–76 marking the beginning of extensive Soviet involvement, so that the movements supported in the late 1970s received more than those whose struggle had ended in 1974–75. Yet, an alternative explanation

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.